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Abstract This article introduces and analyzes random conjugates of bankruptcy
rules. A random conjugate is a rule which is derived from the definition of the under-
lying rule for two-claimant problems. For example, the random conjugate of the Au-
mann–Maschler rule yields an extension of concede-and-divide: the basic solution for
bankruptcy problems with two claimants. Using the concept of random conjugates an
alternative characterization of the proportional rule is provided. It turns out that the
procedural definition of a random conjugate extends several of the properties of the
underlying rule for two-claimant problems to the general domain of problems with an
arbitrary number of claimants.
1 Introduction
Bankruptcy problems are first treated within the framework of interactive allocation
problems in O’Neill (1982). In a bankruptcy problem a certain amount of money, the
estate, has to be divided among a group of claimants. The amount claimed is larger
than the estate, which gives rise to the problem of determining a fair division of the
estate, satisfactory to all claimants. Many (bankruptcy) rules to solve these problems
have been proposed in the literature. An overview of rules and their properties can be
found in Thomson (2003).
Thomson and Yeh (2008) study the topic of “operators” on the space of all rules. In
particular their interest is in the duality operator, the claims truncation operator, and
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the minimal rights operator. Their study also includes the inheritance of properties of
the original rule by the rule obtained from applying the operator.
In this article we introduce an operator that is in the same spirit as Thomson and
Yeh (2008). In particular we consider random conjugates of rules which are derived
from the definition of the underlying rule for two-claimant problems. Random con-
jugates are general rules, i.e., they are applicable to the domain of all problems. The
random conjugate of a rule can thus be seen as the result of an “extension” operator
that is applied to two-claimant rules. Formally, the extension operator differs from the
operators defined in Thomson and Yeh (2008), since the domain of these operators is
the space of all rules and not only two-claimant rules.
Two-claimant rules haven been extended to general rules in several ways. For
example Thomson (2007) deals with the construction of a consistent extension (in the
sense of Aumann and Maschler (1985)) whenever it exists, whereas Moulin (2000),
Dominguez and Thomson (2006), Hokari and Thomson (2008), and Thomson (2008)
consider consistent extensions of specific two-claimant rules. Furthermore, Dagan and
Volij (1997) introduce a way to define an extension of any two-claimant rule that is
so-called average consistent. Dagan and Volij (1997) and Hokari and Thomson (2008)
answer the question which properties are preserved by the extension operator under
consideration.
Random conjugates are the result of a different type of extension operator. It recur-
sively uses the procedural definition of the original rule for two-claimant problems.
The idea of a random conjugate is inspired by the extension of the standard solution
of two-person cooperative games to a solution of cooperative games (the consensus
value) with an arbitrary finite set of players provided by Ju et al. (2004). The under-
lying idea is that claimants leave the group one by one in a specific (but random)
order. At the moment a claimant leaves the (remaining) group, he receives a part of
the estate that is left at that stage. The amount he gets is based on the underlying rule
for a two-claimant problem in which he is seen as one claimant and the rest of the
group together as the other. In this way the underlying rule is applied recursively to
a two-claimant setting. Taking the average over all possible orders, one then obtains
the random conjugate of a rule.
The application of the random conjugate of a given rule can be motivated as fol-
lows. Suppose there is a bank that manages the estate, using a specific rule as its
leading allocation principle. The bank knows the total amount of the claims, but is
ignorant about the exact number of claimants. Now the claimants arrive in a specific
(but random) order at the bank. So at the time a specific claimant arrives, the bank
only knows the remaining estate, the claim of the present claimant, and the total claims
of the possible claimants that are to arrive in future. Therefore, at that moment the
bank applies its allocation principle in a two-claimant setting. After all claimants have
arrived, an instance of the associated random conjugate will be the chosen alloca-
tion. The random conjugate averages over all instances corresponding to all possible
orders.
Our first result will be an alternative characterization of the proportional rule, based
on the procedural definition of a random conjugate. Moreover, we will show that the
random conjugate of a rule is appealing in the sense that if some important proper-
ties (like invariance under claims truncation, self-duality, and minimal rights first) are
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satisfied by the rule in two-claimant problems, then these properties are inherited on
the domain of all problems by the random conjugate.
Finally we note that the concept of random conjugates provides a way to extend
the principles of rules that are only applicable to two-claimant problems to arbitrary
problems. As an example one can think of concede-and-divide. In a problem with
only two claimants, e.g., the run-to-the-bank rule (cf. O’Neill (1982)), the Aumann–
Maschler rule (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)), and the adjusted proportional rule
(cf. Curiel et al. (1988)) coincide. Thomson (2003) refers to this basic or standard rule
for a two-claimant setting as concede-and-divide. The related concede-and-divide
principle is also known as the contested garment principle (Aumann and Maschler
(1985)). The idea behind concede-and-divide is appealing, and deserves an extension
to problems with more than two claimants. Aumann and Maschler (1985) hint at a
possible extension, but they only consider a fixed order (based on increasing claims)
and restrict to intermediate sizes of the estate. Besides this extension mentioned in
Aumann and Maschler (1985), the concede-and-divide principle has not been extended
conceptually to problems with more than two claimants. The random conjugate of con-
cede-and-divide, the so-called random concede-and-divide rule, does provide such a
conceptual extension to arbitrary problems. In particular, by randomizing over all
possible orders, it eliminates the arbitrariness of proceeding in the order of increasing
claims as proposed by Aumann and Maschler (1985). A comprehensive analysis of
the random concede-and-divide rule can be found in Quant et al. (2005). This article
extends the ideas provided in Quant et al. (2005) to the more general framework of
random conjugates associated to arbitrary rules.
This article is organized as follows: in Sect. 2 the formal definition of the random
conjugate of a rule is introduced. A recursive formula is provided, and a new char-
acterization of the proportional rule is derived. In Sect. 3 it is shown that the random
conjugate of a rule extends important properties of the underlying rule in two-claimant
problems to the domain of all problems.
2 Random conjugates of rules
This section formally introduces for each rule a random conjugate that is based on its
definition for problems in which there are only two claimants present. In this way a
new rule is created that is not only applicable to two-claimant problems, but to arbitrary
problems.
A bankruptcy problem consists of a triple (N , E, c), where E is the estate that has
to be divided among a finite set of claimants N , and c ∈ RN , c ≥ 0 is a vector of
claims. By the nature of a bankruptcy problem we assume that E ≤ ∑i∈N ci . The
class of all such problems is denoted by C. Let (N , E, c) ∈ C. A function f on C is a
(bankruptcy) rule if for all problems (N , E, c):
(i) f (N , E, c) ∈ RN ,
(ii) 0 ≤ fi (N , E, c) ≤ ci for all i ∈ N ,
(iii) ∑i∈N fi (N , E, c) = E .
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Moreover, we assume a rule f to be anonymous, which basically means that the
identity of an agent does not matter. An overview of rules proposed in the literature is
found in Thomson (2003).
The random conjugate of a rule is based on the definition of the underlying rule
in two-claimant problems and will respect the principles of this rule in its procedural
definition. The underlying idea behind this random conjugate is that claimants leave
the group one by one in a specific (but random) order. If a claimant leaves the group
he receives a part of the estate. The amount given to him is based on the outcome
given by the underlying rule for problems with two claimants. He himself is seen as
one claimant, while the remaining group as a whole is viewed as the other claimant
and where its claim is determined by adding all individual claims. The part that is
distributed to the rest of the group acts as the new estate in the following step, when
the next claimant is leaving. Taking the average over all possible orders results in the
random conjugate of a rule.
An order of N is a bijective function σ : {1, . . . , |N |} → N . The claimant at
position k in the order σ is denoted by σ(k). The set of all orders of N is denoted by
(N ). Let f be a rule, (N , E, c) ∈ C and σ ∈ (N ). The order σ is interpreted as the
order in which claimants are leaving with a certain amount of the estate based on the
rule f . This results in a vector sσ, f (N , E, c). Formally the vector sσ, f (N , E, c) ∈ RN
is recursively defined as follows. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}. Then
s
σ, f
σ(k)(N , E, c) = fσ(k)
⎛










where σ(k)c is a claimant that can be seen as the combination of the claimants σ(k +
1), . . . , σ (|N |). His claim is the result of adding all the claims of these claimants.
Furthermore, Ek is the amount of the estate that is left if σ(k) is leaving the group, so
E1 = E, Ek = Ek−1 − sσ, fσ(k−1)(N , E, c)(2 ≤ k ≤ |N |).1
The random conjugate of a rule averages between all possible orders.
Definition Let f be a rule. The random conjugate of f , denoted by R f , is defined by





i (N , E, c)
for all i ∈ N and all (N , E, c) ∈ C.
Note that in the case |N | = 2, with σ 1 = (12) and σ 2 = (21), sσ 1, f (N , E, c) =
sσ
2, f (N , E, c) = f (N , E, c), for any rule f , estate E and claim vector c ∈ RN .
Hence, for two-claimant problems (N , E, c), R f (N , E, c) = f (N , E, c).
1 Note that Ek depends on the rule f under consideration. For expositional purposes, however, we omit f
from the notation.
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An alternative characterization of the random conjugate of a rule is provided in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 Let (N , E, c) ∈ C. Then for all i ∈ N
R fi (N , E, c) = 1|N | fi
⎛















N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
)
,
where ic is a claimant that can be seen as a combination of all other claimants, E− j
is the amount that is left of the estate if claimant j is the first one to leave, i.e.,
E− j = E − f j
⎛










and c− j ∈ RN\{ j} denotes the claim vector c, in which the claim of claimant j is
omitted.
Proof Let i ∈ N . We analyze the payoff R fi (N , E, c) by considering the payoff of
claimant i in all possible orders. Let σ ∈ (N ).















Case 2: σ(1) = j and j = i . Let σ¯ ∈ (N\{ j}) be such that σ¯ (k) = σ(k + 1),
k ∈ {1, . . . , |N | − 1}. Then
s
σ, f
i (N , E, c) = sσ¯ , fi
(
N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
)
,
which directly follows from the recursive definition of the vector sσ, f (N , E, c).
Hence,






















i (N , E, c)
= (|N | − 1)!|N |! fi
⎛





















N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
)
= 1|N | fi
⎛





















N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
)
= 1|N | fi
⎛















N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
)
. unionsq
By means of Theorem 2.1 it readily follows (by induction) that for all (N , E, c) ∈ C
it is true that 0 ≤ R f (N , E, c) ≤ c for each rule f . Moreover, it is readily seen
that also R f is anonymous. Hence, the random conjugate of a rule is indeed a rule
itself.
In a problem with only two claimants, e.g., the run-to-the-bank rule (cf.
O’Neill (1982)), the Aumann–Maschler rule (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)) and
the adjusted proportional rule (cf. Curiel et al. (1988)) coincide. Hence, the ran-
dom conjugates of these rules coincide too. Thomson (2003) refers to this basic or
standard rule in two-claimant problems as concede-and-divide, abbreviated to CD
and analogously we will refer to the random conjugates of the above three rules
as the random concede-and-divide rule RCD. The related concede-and-divide prin-
ciple for two-claimant problems is also known as the contested garment principle
(Aumann and Maschler (1985)). It is based on the idea that each claimant concedes
the amount of the estate that is not claimed by himself to the other claimant. This
amount can be seen as a minimal right of a claimant. Subsequently, the amount left
of the estate after giving both claimants their minimal rights is divided equally. A
comprehensive discussion of the random concede-and-divide rule can be found in
Quant et al. (2005). The next example illustrates the random concede-and-divide
rule.
Example 2.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, E = 12, and c = (4, 6, 8). Consider the order
σ = (123). Then claimant 1 is the first claimant who leaves the group. Claimant 2
and 3 together have a total claim of 14. The minimal right of claimant 1 equals 0, and
claimant 2 and 3 have together a minimal right of E − c1 = 8. Claimant 1 receives
0 + 12−0−82 = 2. Now claimant 2 is leaving and the remaining estate is 12 − 2 = 10.
The minimal rights of claimant 2 and 3, respectively, are 10 − 8 = 2 and 10 − 6 = 4.
Hence claimant 2 leaves with 2+ 10−2−42 = 4, and claimant 3 receives 4+ 10−4−22 = 6.
This yields sσ,C D(N , E, c) = (2, 4, 6).
All vectors sσ,C D(N , E, c), σ ∈ (N ) are given in the table below.
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σ sσ,C D(N , E, c)
(123) (2, 4, 6)
(132) (2, 4, 6)
(213)
(























RC D(N , E, c) = 16
∑
σ∈(N )
sσ,C D(N , E, c) = 16 (14, 23, 35).
Note that the random concede-and-divide rule conceptually extends the concede-and-
divide principle to arbitrary problems, but it differs from the run-to-the-bank rule, the
adjusted proportional rule, and the Aumann–Maschler rule, which respectively give
the allocations 16 (16, 22, 34),
(






, and (2, 4, 6).
One could wonder whether the random concede-and-divide rule is the consensus
value (introduced in Ju et al. (2004)) of the corresponding bankruptcy game, since both
rules are based on an extension of the standard solution for the case when there are
only two claimants/players present. However, the random concede-and-divide allo-
cation of a bankruptcy problem generally does not equal the consensus value of the
corresponding bankruptcy game. In fact the last approach does not determine a rule.2
The proportional rule is an example of a rule that does not satisfy the concede-
and-divide principle in two-claimant problems. Let (N , E, c) ∈ C. For all i ∈ N the
proportional rule (PROP) is defined by
PROPi (N , E, c) = ci∑
j∈N c j
· E .
With the help of the definition of sσ,P RO P (N , E, c), as given in Eq. 1, it is immediately
seen that for all σ ∈ (N ), we have sσ,P RO P (N , E, c) = P RO P(N , E, c). There-
fore, the random conjugate of the proportional rule coincides with the proportional
rule itself, or stated differently the proportional rule is invariant under the operator that
assigns to each two-claimant rule its random conjugate. In fact the proportional rule
is the only rule f for which sσ, f (N , E, c) = f (N , E, c) for all (N , E, c) ∈ C and all
σ ∈ (N ). To prove this we use a characterization of the proportional rule based on a
property which is called no advantageous merging or splitting: for all (N , E, c) ∈ C
and all T ⊂ N it is true that
ftc
(





f j (N , E, c),
2 The following situation provides a counterexample: let (N , E, c) = ({1, 2, 3}, 100, (60, 60, 1)). The
consensus value of the corresponding game equals (48, 48, 4). For comparison, RC D(N , E, c) =
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where tc, with minor abuse of notation, can be seen as the merging of all players in





j∈N\T c j . In fact no advantageous merging or splitting states that merging
a group of players to one player with added claims, in total yields the same payoff
to these players. The proportional rule is the unique rule satisfying this property (cf.
O’Neill (1982), Chun (1988), de Frutos (1999) and Ju et al. (2007)).
Theorem 2.2 Let f be a rule and suppose that for all (N , E, c) ∈ C we have
f (N , E, c) = sσ, f (N , E, c) for all σ ∈ (N ). Then f is the proportional rule.
Proof It suffices to show that f satisfies no advantageous merging or splitting.
Let T ⊂ N and σ ∈ (N ) be such that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |T |}, σ (k) ∈ T . Hence,
in the order σ the claimants in T are the first to leave. Define σ ∗ ∈ (T ∪ {tc}) by
σ ∗(k) = σ(k) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |T |} and σ ∗(|T | + 1) = tc. Now consider player
σ(1). Merging all the players in N\{σ(1)} yields a player with the same claim as the







































T ∪ {tc}, E, cT,tc). Applying this argument |T | times
by using in each step that the estate and the claims of the two-claimant problems in
both cases coincide, it follows that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |T |}:
s
σ, f




T ∪ {tc}, E, cT,tc
)
. (2)


















T ∪ {tc}, E, cT,tc
)
= sσ ∗, ftc
(
T ∪ {tc}, E, cT,tc
)
= sσ ∗, fσ ∗(|T |+1)
(







σ(k)(N , E, c)
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f j (N , E, c).
Here, the first and last equality follow from the assumption on f , that each order
gives rise to the same allocation vector which is the outcome induced by f . The sec-
ond equality follows from the definition of σ ∗, the third equality from Eqs. 2 and 3,
and finally, the fourth equality is implied by the definition of σ . So f satisfies no
advantageous merging or splitting, and therefore, f is the proportional rule. unionsq
3 Properties of random conjugates of rules
In this section we analyze some general properties of the random conjugate of a rule.
In particular we focus on the inheritance of special properties that are satisfied by
the original rule in the two-claimant setting. For various rules characterizations are
provided by a combination of properties by which this rule is uniquely determined.
An overview of properties (and characterizations) of rules can be found in Thomson
(2003). This section shows that many of these properties, but not all, are inherited
by the random conjugate of a rule if the property is satisfied by the original rule in
two-claimant problems.
For example, properties that are inherited by the random conjugate of a rule are
homogeneity and resource monotonicity. Furthermore, claims monotonicity is pre-
served whenever a two-claimant rule satisfies both claims and resource monotonic-
ity.3 The proofs are rather straightforward (by induction) and are left to the reader. In
the following theorem we focus on the inheritance of the properties invariance under
claims truncation, self-duality, and minimal rights first. These are properties that are
frequently used in characterizations of several rules.
We first recall the definitions of these properties. Let f be a rule. The rule f is
invariant under claims truncation if for all (N , E, c) ∈ C, we have f (N , E, c) =
f (N , E, c¯), where c¯ ∈ RN is the truncated claim vector, i.e., c¯i = min{E, ci } for all





j∈N c j − E, c
)
. The rule f satisfies minimal rights first if for all (N , E, c) ∈
C, we have f (N , E, c) = r(N , E, c)+ f
(
N , E − ∑ j∈N r j , c − r
)
, where r ∈ RN is
the minimal right vector, i.e., ri (N , E, c) = max
{
0, E − ∑ j∈N\{i} c j
}
for all i ∈ N .
Note that the above three properties can also be defined for fixed claimants sizes only.
Theorem 3.1 Let f be a rule.
(i) If f satisfies invariance under claims truncation in two-claimant problems, then
R f satisfies invariance under claims truncation.
3 Order preservation is preserved if a rule also satisfies resource monotonicity, claims monotonicity, and
self-duality.
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(ii) If f satisfies self-duality in two-claimant problems, then R f satisfies self-dual-
ity.
(iii) If f satisfies minimal rights first in two-claimant problems, then R f satisfies
minimal rights first.
Proof All proofs are given by an induction argument on the number of claimants
present.
(i) Assume that f satisfies invariance under claims truncation for two-claimant
problems. Let (N , E, c) ∈ C and define (N , E, c¯) by c¯i = min{E, ci } for all i ∈ N .
Let |N | = 2. Since the random conjugate of a rule coincides with the original rule in
the two-claimant case, it follows by the assumption that R f (N , E, c) = R f (N , E, c¯)
for |N | = 2.
Let k ∈ N, k ≥ 2. Assume that for all problems with number of claimants less than
or equal to k invariance under claims truncation is satisfied. Let N be such that |N | =
k +1. We will use the recursive formula of Theorem 2.1 to prove that R fi (N , E, c) =
R fi (N , E, c¯) for all i ∈ N . Since f is invariant under claims truncation for two-
claimant problems and because min{E,∑ j∈N\{i} c j } = min{E,
∑
j∈N\{i} c¯ j } it is
true that (with notations as in Theorem 2.1)
R fi (N , E, c) = 1|N | fi
⎛















N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
)
= 1|N | fi
⎛






















N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
)
= 1|N | fi
⎛






















N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
)
= 1|N | fi
⎛















N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
) (4)
Let j ∈ N\{i} and let c˜ ∈ RN\{ j} be defined as c˜k = min{E− j , ck} for all k ∈ N\{ j}.
Then also c˜k = min{E− j , c¯k}. Using the induction hypothesis twice we find that
R f (N\{ j}, E− j , c− j
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and
R f (N\{ j}, E− j , c¯− j
) = R f (N\{ j}, E− j , c˜− j
)
.
Using the above observations, formula (4) can be rewritten as
R fi (N , E, c) = 1|N | fi
⎛















N\{ j}, E− j , c¯− j
)
= R fi (N , E, c¯).
We may conclude that R f satisfies invariance under claims truncation for arbitrary
population sizes.
(ii) Assume that f satisfies self-duality for two-claimant problems. We first note
that to prove self-duality of R f , it is sufficient to prove that for all σ ∈ (N ) and all
(N , E, c) we have that





c j − E, c
⎞
⎠ . (5)
That (5) is valid if |N | = 2 is obvious, because f is self-dual in two-claimant problems
and f (N , E, c) = R f (N , E, c) for all problems (N , E, c) with |N | = 2.
Let k ∈ N, k ≥ 2. Assume that for all problems (N , E, c) such that |N | ≤ k and
all σ ∈ (N ), formula (5) is satisfied. Take (N , E, c) ∈ C, such that |N | = k + 1 and
let σ ∈ (N ). Denote ∑ j∈N c j by C . We first prove that
s
σ, f
σ(1)(N , E, c) + sσ, fσ(1)(N , C − E, c) = cσ(1). (6)
Since σ(1) is the first claimant who leaves the group, we have that
s
σ, f
σ(1)(N , E, c) = fσ(1)






σ(1)(N , C − E, c) = fσ(1)
({σ(1), σ (1)c}, C − E, (cσ(1), C − cσ(1)
))
. (8)
Now Eq. 6 immediately follows by adding Eqs. 7 and 8 and using the self-duality of
f in a problem with only two claimants.
Let E−σ(1) denote the amount that is left of E , if σ(1) has first left the group in the
problem (N , E, c) and similarly (C − E)−σ(1) is the amount that is left of E , if σ(1)
has first left the group in the problem (N , C − E, c). From Eq. 6 it follows that
E−σ(1) + (C − E)−σ(1) = C − cσ(1). (9)
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Let σ¯ ∈ (N\{σ(1)}) be the order of all other claimants that is induced by σ . Let
i ∈ N\{σ(1)}. Then
s
σ, f




= ci − sσ¯ , fi
(
N\{σ(1)}, C − cσ(1) − E−σ(1), c−σ(1)
)
(9)= ci − sσ¯ , fi
(
N\{σ(1)}, (C − E)−σ(1), c−σ(1)
)
= ci − sσ, fi (N , C − E, c).
The second equality follows from the induction hypothesis. This completes the induc-
tion argument, R f satisfies self-duality.
(iii) Assume that f satisfies minimal rights first for two-claimant problems. Note
that if for all (N , E, c) and all σ ∈ (N ) we have that
sσ, f (N , E, c) = r(N , E, c) + sσ, f (N , E −
∑
j∈N
r j (N , E, c), c − r(N , E, c)), (10)
then R f satisfies minimal rights first. For |N | = 2, Eq. 10 is true, because f satisfies
minimal rights first for |N | = 2.
Let k ∈ N, k ≥ 2. Assume that for all problems (N , E, c) such that |N | ≤ k and for
all σ ∈ (N ), formula (10) is satisfied. Let (N , E, c) ∈ C be such that |N | = k + 1
and let σ ∈ (N ). For ease of notation we define R(B) = ∑ j∈N r j (B) for a problem
B ∈ C. We first prove that
s
σ, f
σ(1)(N , E, c) = rσ(1)(N , E, c) + sσ, fσ(1) (N , E − R(N , E, c), c − r(N , E, c)) .
(11)
For ease of notation we define the following problems:
B1 := (N , E, c),
B2 :=




({σ(1), σ (1)c}, E − R(B2),
(
cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B2), C − cσ(1) − rσ(1)c (B2)
))
B4 := (N , E − R(B1), c − r(B1))
B5 :=
({σ(1), σ (1)c}, E − R(B1),
(
cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B1),
C − (cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B1)) − R(B1)
))
As f satisfies minimal rights first in the case |N | = 2, we can deduce that
s
σ, f
σ(1)(N , E, c) = sσ, fσ(1)(B1)
= fσ(1)(B2)
= rσ(1)(B2) + fσ(1)(B3)
= rσ(1)(B1) + fσ(1)(B3),
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= max {0, E − (C − cσ(1))
} = rσ(1)(B2).
(12)
On the other hand
rσ(1)(B1) + sσ, fσ(1)(B4) = rσ(1)(B1) + fσ(1)(B5).
So for (11) to be true we need to prove that fσ(1)(B3) = fσ(1)(B5). We distinguish
between two cases.
Case 1: ri (B1) = 0 for all i ∈ N\{σ(1)}.
This implies that R(B1) = rσ(1)(B1) and rσ(1)(B5) = 0. Hence, using minimal
rights first for two-claimant problems
fσ(1)(B5)
= fσ(1)
({σ(1), σ (1)c}, E − rσ(1)(B1) − rσ(1)c(B5),
(
cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B1),
C − cσ(1) − rσ(1)c (B5)
))
(12)= fσ(1)({σ(1), σ (1)c}, E − rσ(1)(B2) − rσ(1)c(B5), (cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B2),
C − cσ(1) − rσ(1)c(B5))).
Since
rσ(1)c (B5) = max
{




= max {0, E − cσ(1)
}
= rσ(1)c(B2),
it follows that fσ(1)(B3) = fσ(1)(B5).
Case 2: there is i ∈ N\{σ(1)} such that ri (B1) > 0.
It follows that cσ(1) < E and also
cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B1) < E − rσ(1)(B1). Furthermore
ri (B1) = E −
∑
j∈N\{i}
c j ≤ E −
∑
j∈N\{σ(1),i}
r j (B1) − cσ(1)
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implying that cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B1) ≤ E − R(B1). From this we can derive that
rσ(1)c(B5) = max
{
0, E − R(B1) − (cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B1))
}







0, E − cσ(1)
} = E − cσ(1).
and, hence,




= cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B1)
= E − rσ(1)(B1) − (E − cσ(1))
= E − rσ(1)(B2) − rσ(1)c (B2)
= E − R(B2).
Since f satisfies minimal rights first in two-claimant problems (and hence especially in
problem B5), the fact that rσ(1)(B5) = 0 and using equality (12) and the above results,
we find that fσ(1)(B5) equals
fσ(1)
({σ(1), σ (1)c}, E − R(B2),
(




By using (12) and (13), we can derive that
C − (cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B2)
) − R(B1) − rσ(1)c (B5)
= C − (cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B2)
) − R(B1) −
(
E − R(B1) − (cσ(1) − rσ(1)(B1))
)
= C − E
= C − cσ(1) − (E − cσ(1)) = C − cσ(1) − rσ(1)c(B2).
and hence fσ(1)(B5) = fσ(1)(B3), which establishes (11).
Now Eq. 11 is proved, it remains to show that for each i ∈ N\{σ(1)}
s
σ, f
i (N , E, c) = ri (N , E, c) + sσ, fi (N , E − R(N , E, c), c − r(N , E, c)).
This boils down to proving the following claim.
Claim: sσ, fi (N , E, c) = ri (B1) + sσ, fi (B4), for all i ∈ N\σ(1). (14)
To do so, we also define, additional to B1, . . . , B5, the problems
B6 := (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1), c−σ(1)),
B7 := (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1) − R(B1) + rσ(1)(B1), (c − r(B1))−σ(1)),
B8 := (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1) − R(B1) + rσ(1)(B1) − R(B7), (c − r)−σ(1) − r(B7)).
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From the definition of E−σ(1) and (E − R(B1))−σ(1), it can be concluded that
E−σ(1) − R(B1) = E − sσ, fσ(1)(B1) − R(B1)
(11)= E − rσ(1)(B1) − sσ, fσ(1)(B4) − R(B1)
= (E − R(B1))−σ(1) − rσ(1)(B1) (15)
Let σ¯ ∈ (N\σ(1)) be the order of all other claimants that is induced by σ .
Now let i ∈ N\{σ(1)}. Using the induction hypothesis we find
s
σ, f
i (B1) = sσ¯ , fi (B6)
= ri (B6) + sσ¯ , fi (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1) − R(B6), c−σ(1) − r(B6)). (16)
On the other hand
ri (B1) + sσ, fi (B4) = ri (B1) + sσ¯ , fi (N\{σ(1)}, (E−R(B1))−σ(1), (c − r(B1)−σ(1)),
and hence, by (15)
ri (B1) + sσ, fi (B4) = ri (B1) + sσ¯ , fi (B7).
Since |N\{σ(1)}| = k, we can apply the induction hypothesis to the problem B7. For
this we first calculate the minimal right ri (B7):




E−σ(1) − R(B1) + rσ(1)(B1) −
∑
j∈N\{i,σ (1)}








E−σ(1) − ri (B1) −
∑
j∈N\{i,σ (1)}
















= max {ri (B6), ri (B1)} − ri (B1)
= ri (B6) − ri (B1). (17)
The last equality follows, since E−σ(1) ≥ E − cσ(1) and hence ri (B6) ≥ ri (B1). We
can deduce that
ri (B1) + sσ, fi (B4) = ri (B1) + ri (B7) + sσ¯ , fi (B8)
(17)= ri (B6) + sσ¯ , fi
(
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According to Eq. 16 this indeed shows that sσ, fi (B1) = ri (B1) + sσ, fi (B4) and our
claim (cf. (14)) is proven.
This completes the proof of minimal rights first of R f . unionsq
Not all properties are inherited by the random conjugate of a rule, which is shown
in the following example. This example illustrates that composition down is not nec-
essarily inherited. A rule f satisfies composition down if for (N , E, c) ∈ C and each
E ′ < E we have
f (N , E ′, c) = f (N , E ′, f (N , E, c)) .
The example uses the constrained equal awards rule. The constrained equal awards
rule (abbreviated to CEA) is a rule that satisfies composition down. The allocation
prescribed by the CEA rule for a problem (N , E, c) ∈ C is given by
CEAi (N , E, c) = min{α, ci },
for all i ∈ N , where α is chosen such that ∑i∈N CEAi (N , E, c) = E .
Example 3.1 Consider the problem (N , E, c) with N = {1, 2, 3}, E = 100, and c =
(70, 50, 30) and let E ′ = 90. We first calculate RCEA(N , E, c) and RCEA(N , E ′, c).
The following table contains the vectors sσ,C E A(N , E, c) and sσ,C E A(N , E ′, c), for
all σ ∈ (N ).
σ sσ,C E A(N , E, c) sσ,C E A(N , E ′, c)
(123) (50, 25, 25) (45, 22 12 , 22
1
2 )
(132) (50, 25, 25) (45, 22 12 , 22
1
2 )
(213) (25, 50, 25) (22 12 , 45, 22
1
2 )
(231) (25, 50, 25) (22 12 , 45, 22
1
2 )
(312) (35, 35, 30) (30, 30, 30)
(321) (35, 35, 30) (30, 30, 30)
Consequently
RCEA(N , E, c) = 16 (220, 220, 160) and RCEA(N , E ′, c) = 16 (195, 195, 150).
Next we calculate RCEA(N , E ′, RCEA(N , E, c)). The corresponding vectors
sσ,C E A(N , E ′, RCEA(N , E, c)) are given below.
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σ sσ,C E A(N , E ′, RCEA(N , E, c))
(123) 16 (220, 160, 160)
(132) 16 (220, 160, 160)
(213) 16 (160, 220, 160)
(231) 16 (160, 220, 160)
(312) 16 (190, 190, 160)
(321) 16 (190, 190, 160)
As a result
RCEA(N , E ′, RCEA(N , E, c)) = 16 (190, 190, 160),
which does not equal RCEA(N , E ′, c). We conclude that RCEA does not satisfy
composition down, although CEA does.
As is proved in Dagan (1996), the CEA rule is the unique rule that satisfies equal
treatment of equals, invariance under claims truncation, and composition up. The
random conjugate RCEA also satisfies equal treatment of equals and invariance under
claims truncation, since both properties are inherited by the random conjugate of a
rule. As the above example shows RCEA differs from CEA, hence RCEA does not
satisfy composition up. This means that composition up is not necessarily inherited
by the random conjugate of a rule.
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